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“So Hard was it to Release Princes whom Fortuna 
had put in her Chains:”1 Queens and Female Rulers 
as Hostage- and Captive-Takers and Holders
Colleen Slater
ostage- and captive-taking2 were fundamental processes in 
medieval warfare and medieval society in general. Despite this 
importance, however, only recently have these practices received 
significant scholarly attention, and certain aspects of these customs have 
been overlooked; in particular, the relationship of women to these prac-
tices, which has been explored by only one scholar, Yvonne Friedman.3 
Friedman’s work on female captives, while illuminating, only focuses on 
women as passive victims of war; that is, as captives to be taken, sold, or 
traded. In fact, the idea that women could only be victims of hostage- and 
captive-taking is almost universally assumed in the scholarship. But some 
women from the highest echelons of medieval society figure in the story 
as a good deal more than passive victims. The sources are littered with 
examples that not only illuminate the importance of women and gender 
to the customs/practices associated with hostages and captives, but also 
how women used them to exercise power and independence militarily, 
politically, and socially. Able to take matters into their own hands, these 
women played the game of politics, ruled their own or their husbands’ 
lands, and participated in the active taking and holding of hostages and 
captives. Examining these women is essential not only for expanding our 
knowledge of the more general processes of hostage- and captive-taking 
and holding, but also for understanding how and why women were able 
(or unable) to navigate them. Women could be significantly involved in 
taking or holding hostages and captives, and this could in some cases 
be understood by contemporaries as an activity women were regularly 
able to participate in. 
A study such as this one, however, has even broader implications. 
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The sources’ acceptance of women’s engagement in these roles and their 
representations of women managing men and exercising power must 
be assessed against contemporary anxieties that such women presented 
problems, broke social norms and mores, and needed to be contained. 
As a result, these examples provide the means to examine women’s 
participation in warfare, politics, and society in general. This paper’s 
purpose at the most basic level is therefore twofold: first, to illuminate 
a few of the many examples of women—for the purposes of this argu-
ment, queens and other female rulers, in particular4—as hostage- and 
captive-takers and holders in order to suggest that women performed 
such tasks with some regularity; and second, to place such instances 
in their historical context so as to better understand women’s place in 
medieval society and in the medieval imagination.
The study of women in these active roles, however, is not without 
difficulty. While previous cultures like the Romans regularly featured 
hostage- and captive-taking customs in their literature and art,5 medieval 
hostage and captive exchanges and negotiations are rarely treated with 
any detail in the sources,6 so the practices surrounding the taking of 
hostages and captives must be extrapolated from infrequent and often 
conflicting references. Further, while there may have been certain “rules” 
that were supposed to be followed in taking hostages and captives, those 
rules were often fluid.7 As a result, deciphering where women might 
or might not have fitted into the social “ritual” of these exchanges is 
not always easy. This essay marks an exploratory attempt at doing so. 
It will propose that women could participate in all aspects of hostage- 
and captive-taking from receiving the formal submission of hostages 
and determining the fate of hostages and captives to participating in the 
strategic abuse of hostages and captives to further their political goals.
A brief outline of some of the practices involved is useful here in 
distinguishing the similarities and differences between the two types. 
Hostage-taking and giving was in many ways very much like a legal 
agreement in that such occasions usually represented the formal, public 
submission of one party to another. As a result, such acts required certain 
formalities and understandings of purpose and meaning between the two 
parties. Yet at the same time, these practices can illustrate just how com-
plicated such exchanges and their meanings were. For example, hostage 
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exchanges had a built-in expectation of proper treatment, especially of 
nobly born hostages. Mistreatment of hostages was usually frowned 
upon, and “required an explanation [on the part of the hostage-taker] 
if the stigma of dishonorable behavior was to be avoided.”8 At the same 
time, however, hostage-givers knew that their hostages could be mis-
treated either because the hostage-giver had not lived up to his or her end 
of the arrangement or because the hostage-taker felt that such a display 
of power was necessary under the circumstances. Such hostage abuse, 
however, could stiffen rebellion against the hostage-taker or be seen as a 
flagrant call for war, especially if the hostage was of a high social status,9 
and thus abuse was not something to be considered frivolously. 
Captive-taking presents even more problems because while it, too, 
was an issue of submission, it was done in the heat or aftermath of battle, 
making the process much less formal or regulated. Captive-taking also 
had a greater amount of implied and overt violence: hostages were given, 
but captives were taken, which gave captives less protection in the eyes of 
medieval society. This may explain why, despite cultural admonitions to 
treat captives with care and kindness, medieval captors could more easily 
abuse captives without fear of retribution or social stigma.
Although the modes of hostage-taking often changed to fit the par-
ticular situation, unlike captive-taking, some more concrete generaliza-
tions about the process can be made. The first is that there are two broad 
categories of causes for taking hostages: finite and indefinite.10 Finite 
causes included temporary postponements of a siege in the expectation 
of surrender, the conditional release of a prisoner, a hostage given for 
safe passage through a territory who is then returned when the giver 
has completed his travel through the land in question, and the hos-
tage who is given in exchange for land. The evidence suggests that the 
first three causes had a relatively high success rate because “these [are] 
less subject to the pressure of changed circumstances,” while the last 
of the four—a hostage for the return of land—appears to have had a 
higher rate of reneging on the part of the hostage giver.11 Most hostage 
agreements, however, fall into the second category of hostage-taking: 
indefinite agreements, defined as “grants after a defeat or subjection 
to guarantee the positive obligation of continued fidelity,” including 
loyalty oaths.12  
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Hostages, however, not only had a legal function, but also had real 
political and social “symbolic value,” serving as public reminders of 
submission, the relative status of hostage givers and receivers, or even 
the equality of the two parties when hostages were exchanged rather 
than unilaterally given.13 The value of a hostage “lay in the bonds of 
lordship, obligation and reciprocity” because hostages were “an impor-
tant projection of lordship: for both contemporaries and the audience 
of the sources, the holding of hostages could also be highly symbolic, 
personifying no less than the submission of one lord to another.” They 
were one tool among many that medieval rulers could use to display 
their power to and over both their own native populations and foreign 
ones.14 Because of these elements, grants of hostages often involved 
parties outside the three immediately privy to agreement (the giver, the 
receiver, and the hostage him/herself ).15 In this way, hostage exchanges 
became a community event.
Historians, however, need to be careful in unpacking the language 
of hostage exchanges in the sources, and to “distinguish between those 
occasions on which the receipt of hostages demonstrated tangible sub-
ordination and those which projected power.”16 Taking hostages was 
one way rulers could try to make themselves appear stronger and their 
enemies appear weaker than they were in actuality, and the language 
of the sources can sometimes make a situation appear much more cut 
and dried than it really was. They may, for example, imply that those 
giving hostages rendered themselves subordinate to the hostage-taker, 
where the reality of the situation sometimes reflected otherwise. Like-
wise, taking hostages was not always about prestige, submission, and 
superiority; it often had very practical elements such as providing an 
extra incentive for warring parties to come to an agreement. Violence 
to hostages was never far below the surface, and the implicit threat to 
important people in the hostage-giver’s life was likely to induce results. 
Finally, several historians have suggested that hostageship was in fact a 
type of mutually shared social language between different ethnic groups. 
It was a way for foreign adversaries to communicate their objectives 
to each other, especially in terms of peace and trade. Hostages were 
thus “mutually recognized personification[s] of a guarantee of behavior, 
demonstrable of honourable intentions.”17 Even when trade was absent 
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or interrupted and peace broken, the exchange or provision of hostages 
was one way in which both parties indicated that they understood the 
rules of the game.
To Have and to Hold, from this Day Forth: 
 Queens as Hostage and Captive Takers, Givers and Holders
The Battle of Lincoln in 1141—in which King Stephen of England was 
captured by his cousin the Empress Matilda—and its aftermath during 
England’s Anarchy, provides several useful pieces of evidence that sug-
gest women were more than capable of taking and holding hostages and 
captives, and suggests several ways in which they fit into the processes of 
hostage- and captive-taking noted above. After her success at the battle, 
Empress Matilda received the submission of various lords, and she seems 
to have done so just as any other wartime victor might. She also set out 
to establish her status as a ruler by determining the fate of her enemies. 
First and foremost, she had to decide King Stephen’s future. She and 
her brother, Robert of Gloucester, settled on life-long imprisonment 
in Robert’s stronghold of Bristol, a center of support for the Empress.18 
The king was not the only prominent lord to be captured, and despite 
her brother’s position as military commander and the fact that she had 
not physically been on the battlefield, it was Matilda who dealt with 
those who had been captured. According to The Chronicle of John, Prior 
of Hexham she “deprived William Peverel of the castle of Nottingham 
. . . [and] [o]ther men of eminence, who were taken with the king, she 
released, an agreement for their ransom having been made.”19 John of 
Worcester reports that many of Stephen’s followers were also captured 
and thrown into prison.20 In the weeks that followed, England’s barons, 
lay and ecclesiastical, seem to have come over to her side, some volun-
tarily, others not. The Gesta Stephani speaks of “some of the king’s men 
. . . being either captured or forcibly expelled from their possessions.” 
Although it is not entirely clear if these are the same men that John of 
Hexham refers to, the language suggests that they were not, but are 
instead men who were captured after the battle of Lincoln, not during 
it. The implication is that these expulsions were carried out at Matilda’s 
behest, as it was she who received the submission “of the greater part of 
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the kingdom.”21 She also seems to have either requested or voluntarily 
been given hostages, since it was through “receiving hostages and men’s 
homage” that the Gesta says she “brought the great part of the kingdom 
under her sway.”22 
The Gesta reports other situations in which the Empress Matilda 
dealt with hostages and captives, depicting her as using the tactic of 
threatening violence against a captive, and, when this failed, ratcheting 
up the harshness of the imprisonment. In 1145, when fortune had again 
turned against Matilda, her forces captured Walter de Pinkeney, castel-
lan of Malmesbury castle, and she held him hostage in exchange for the 
castle. According to the Gesta Stephani, however, Matilda was unable 
to convince Walter to turn over the castle, and King Stephen, hearing 
of Walter’s capture, reinforced the castle as soon as he was able. 23 Frus-
trated, she put him in fetters and threw him in prison.24 Orderic Vitalis 
also reports that she used this approach in Lent of 1138 in Normandy. 
Her retainers captured Ralph of Esson, a local baron who was fighting 
against her, and then handed him over to her to be put in chains until 
he surrendered his castle to her.25 In this she seems to have been acting 
in accordance with traditional customs for the treatment of captives, as 
outlined by Matthew Strickland. Strickland suggests that the condi-
tions for captives themselves could vary drastically, some being held 
honorably and others in less desirable conditions, and that the reasons 
for these differences could range from personal hatred of the captive to 
strategic military goals. The bitter feuds of the Anglo-Norman families 
often led to harsh treatment, as did rebellions. In particular, acquiring 
castles—which under normal circumstances could take a long time with 
great expense—was one of the main reasons for captive abuse. Because 
castles were so hard to take the old-fashioned way, captive abuse, if it 
resulted in a quick and easy surrender of a castle, was acceptable, if not 
applauded.26
 John of Worcester’s chronicle reports yet more examples of Matilda’s 
active involvement in the taking and treatment of hostages and captives. 
Miles of Gloucester, constable of Bristol castle and a supporter of the 
Empress, attacked the area around Bristol in an effort to gain its sup-
port for the Empress. Although Matilda was in Bristol at the time, John 
implies that these actions were done in her name, if not indeed by her 
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personal order, and they could certainly not have been done without her 
knowledge. Matilda left Bristol in October and arrived in Gloucester on 
October 15 looking to “assert her lordship and receive submission” of the 
local population. According to John, those who did not submit suffered 
a similar fate to those in Bristol.27 He also describes captives taken in his 
own city, Worcester, by the citizens of Gloucester who supported the 
Empress. Many in Worcester were taken prisoner and were “led away, 
coupled like dogs, into wretched captivity. Whether they had the means 
or not, they were forced to promise on oath to pay whatever ransom 
the mouthpiece of their captors cruelly fixed.”28 John does not specify 
who the “mouthpiece” was; he may have meant it more generally, or as 
a specific reference to Matilda. However, it is unlikely that a large scale 
effort to subdue the areas around Bristol, Worcester, and Gloucester—
areas connected with her family and her main power base—would have 
been attempted without her knowledge and consent, so it is possible she 
might have ordered such an action. Taking hostages and captives, then, 
seems to be a political tool that Matilda was not only aware of, but, like 
her male colleagues, very capable of using.
Both the Gesta’s and John’s accounts are hostile to Matilda, and 
her choice to treat Walter and these other unnamed men and women 
of England as she did must be read with care.29 The importance of 
these stories here is that Matilda actively took up the responsibilities 
of managing hostages and captives herself, seeing them as a means to 
gain political concessions, speaking with them directly, and choosing 
their punishments. As suggested above, taking and determining the 
fate of hostages was often not only a display of tangible power, but also 
a means of presenting oneself as in a stronger position than one really 
was. Matilda, prior to and despite the defeat of Stephen, was in no way 
guaranteed acceptance as queen of England,30 and while some of the 
sources seem to suggest that she was moments away from taking the 
throne, her situation was tenuous at best. As a result, she appears to 
have used these early submissions, captures, and expulsions as ways of 
presenting herself as a strong, capable ruler in control of England and 
quelling concerns about her ability to rule.
Nor were her actions during the civil war her only experience with 
deciding the fate of hostages and captives, which suggests that her 
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involvement in taking hostages and captives was not merely the product 
of her attempt to take the throne. At least one other case is known in 
which she performed this task. According to the Anglo-Saxon Chron-
icle, it was she who suggested that Henry I’s brother Robert Curthose 
(her own uncle), who had been Henry’s captive since the Battle of 
Tinchebray, be moved to the more secure castle at Cardiff and placed 
under the care of Robert of Gloucester.31 Moreover, while her treatment 
of hostages is sometimes construed as cruel, there is no indication in the 
texts that the authors found Matilda’s taking and dealing with hostages 
and captives an unusual activity for a woman. 
In part this may be because Matilda was not the only woman during 
the Anarchy to exercise the power of dealing with hostages and captives. 
Queen Matilda of Boulogne, wife to her opponent, King Stephen, made 
similar choices. When Robert of Gloucester was captured following the 
rout at Winchester, it was William de Warenne with a force of Flem-
ings who captured him. But they did not keep him and ransom him 
themselves. He was too politically important a figure to merely ransom 
and let go, and as a result, they presented him to Queen Matilda. It was 
Queen Matilda who, after Stephen’s capture, had rallied an army in 
her husband’s defense and led them to London and then Winchester. 
Clearly in charge of the “royalist” party, she determined that Robert 
should be turned over to William of Ypres, one of her and her husband’s 
major mercenary captains, for incarceration at Rochester.32 Nor can this 
be dismissed as merely an instance in which, with her husband absent, 
Matilda served as a figurehead, without real power. Queen Matilda had 
always been heavily involved in the military campaigns of her husband 
during the civil war, and their relationship both politically and personally 
appears to have been a partnership.33 Her ability to actively participate 
in warfare and make strategic military decisions had already been proven 
numerous times during her husband’s reign, so determining Robert’s 
fate was not out of character for her.
Other women also took hostages and captives in military situations, 
a further indication that the Matildas were not simply functioning 
in a unique set of circumstances that allowed them to act outside the 
normal bounds of female behavior. Women were capable of taking and 
controlling hostages and captives for many reasons, one of the most 
20
important being righting a wrong done to another. One of the ear-
liest examples comes from the account in the Abingdon manuscript 
of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle of the deeds of Æthelflæd of Mercia, 
daughter of Alfred the Great, Lady of the Mercians, and wife of Æthel-
red of Mercia. This records that in 916 “. . . before midsummer, on 
16 June, Abbot Ecgberht, guiltless, was killed with his companions. 
. . . And three days later Æthelflæd sent an army into Wales and broke 
down Brecon Mere, and there took the wife of the king as one of thirty-
four [captives].”34 Eleanor of Provence, wife of Henry III of England, 
was instrumental in the pursuit and capture of Henry of Almain, an 
intimate of Simon de Montfort and nephew of her husband Henry III, 
in 1263, after he had attacked a group of royalist ladies attempting to 
escape to France during Simon’s rebellion against her husband. The 
Saint Albans Chronicle reports that his arrest was her doing, and that 
when the barons asked for his release, they had to consult with her as 
well as the king.35 
Property and lordship disputes could also produce situations in which 
women took hostages and captives. Matthew of Paris, for example, 
reports that in 1253 Floris, younger brother of Count William II of Hol-
land and Zeeland, was taken captive by Countess Margaret of Flanders 
when he refused to do homage to her for the counties of Holland and 
Zeeland, which his brother William had given him after William was 
elected king of Germany. Margaret held Floris in prison for two years 
until his release by her eldest son, John d’Avesnes.36 According to a 
claim brought in 1341 by two granddaughters of Robert de Camville, 
Queen Eleanor of Castile, wife of King Edward I of England, allegedly 
had him imprisoned in the late 1270s for not giving her the manor of 
Westerham, which she coveted. The claim stated that the queen, angered 
at Robert’s refusal, conspired with the marshal of the army to make it 
appear as if he had defaulted on his military obligations during Edward 
I’s war in Wales. Although the claim appears to have been false and a 
case of Eleanor’s rapacity in acquiring property during her lifetime,37 it 
also suggests that it was not unthinkable that a queen would use such 
a tactic to extort property. 
Some women seem to have resorted to hostage- and captive-taking for 
gaining and protecting property rather frequently, suggesting that such 
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a method may have been a more common choice rather than an extreme 
one. Women often acted as lords of lands in their own right or as regents 
for male kin, vigorously defending their rights in the same ways as their 
male counterparts. They did not hesitate to use hostages and captives 
if necessary. After the death of her husband King John of England in 
1216 and her return to her native land in 1220, Isabel of Angoulême38 
became involved in several violent disputes over the lordship of land. It 
seems that her son King Henry III of England had wanted Isabel to act 
as a viceroy on behalf of his interests in the south of France, but Isabel 
intended otherwise, asserting rights to property in Cognac that had 
not been in control of the lords of Angoulême since the 1180s. During 
these disputes, she took several hostages, including the two sons of the 
recalcitrant Bartholomew de le Puy, in order to protect herself should 
Bartholomew attempt to harm her.39 She also held her own daughter 
and several others hostage in exchange for part of her dowry. King John’s 
marriage to Isabel had been a disaster for him. He had essentially stolen 
her as a bride from Hugh de Lusignan, inciting a rebellion and causing 
Hugh to side with King Philip Augustus of France, eventually resulting 
in the loss of most of England’s continental possessions. John had tried 
in 1214 to appease the Lusignans and make peace with them by giving 
his young daughter Joan to Hugh de Lusignan in marriage. She was 
sent there to be raised until she was of marriageable age. But after her 
husband’s death, Isabel returned to Angoulême in 1217, and ended up 
marrying Hugh herself in 1220. Isabel wrote to her son, King Henry 
III, saying she had married Hugh for Henry’s own good because Hugh’s 
advisors would not let him consummate the marriage with Joan, and 
were trying to get him to marry a French noblewoman. She asked him 
to turn over her dowry, which included Niort, the castles of Exeter and 
Rockingham, and money left to her by King John. Henry congratulated 
his mother and asked for Joan to be returned, but there were problems. 
Isabel’s dowry was withheld because she had married without Henry’s 
permission, so Isabel and Hugh refused to return Joan. Eventually Pope 
Honorius III intervened, threatening interdict if Joan was not returned. 
He also admonished Isabel for holding Henry’s steward and others as 
hostages and asking ransoms for them. Joan was eventually returned in 
October 1220 when Isabel’s dowry was released.40 
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Women could also receive or extort hostages as a part of peace agree-
ments. In 1218, Duke Theobald I of Lorraine submitted to the judgment 
of Blanche of Navarre, the countess of Champagne and regent for her 
minor son, Theobald IV of Champagne. Duke Theobald had joined in 
the rebellion of Erard I of Brienne, lord of Ramerupt, who was married 
to Philippa, daughter of a previous count of Champagne, through whom 
Erard was claiming the county.41 Blanche joined the war against Erard 
and Duke Theobald with her ally Emperor Frederick II, leading her 
army against the city of Nancy. When Duke Theobald was captured in 
the town of Amance, he was turned over to her as a captive and forced to 
submit to her. She compelled him to sign a charter in which he agreed to 
become a vassal of the counts of Champagne. The agreement stipulated 
that if he broke the treaty he was to surrender himself into the hands 
of the countess as a hostage within forty days.42
Other women were more captive- or hostage-holders than takers. As 
suggested above, hostage-taking rituals often involved parties outside 
the hostage-taker, giver, and hostage themselves, and it was not uncom-
mon for a hostage-taker to confer a hostage on a third party in order to 
maintain what Ryan Lavelle calls “reciprocal relationships beyond those 
of the giver and the recipient.”43 Placing a hostage in the hands of an 
outside party made them guarantors and continual witnesses of the sub-
mission that had been made. It provided them with an extra incentive for 
maintaining the peace settlement. The submission became a community 
event; the more people involved, perhaps the greater chance of success. 
Women sometimes played this role of the third party. The early example 
in Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English People of Ecgfrith, son of 
King Oswiu of Northumbria, being held hostage at the court of Queen 
Cynewise of Mercia in 655 provides evidence that this may have been a 
long-standing tradition for women.44 Queen Matilda of Boulogne, in 
taking over the care of Robert of Gloucester in 1141, may also have been 
fulfilling this role. In 1265, Queen Eleanor of Provence’s son, Edward, 
gave her custody of Adam Gurdon, an important supporter of the baro-
nial cause, during Simon de Montfort’s rebellion against Henry III.45 
Queen Isabel of Angoulême appears to have had control over several of 
her husband King John’s hostages during his reign.46 During the same 
year, the son of William de Braose, was attached to the household of 
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Eleanor de Montfort, Simon de Montfort’s wife, as a hostage in the 
spring and summer of 1265.47
Women may have been chosen for this role for two reasons. On the 
one hand, because—as in the Cynewise case—the queen was closely 
associated with the hostage-taker, the submission achieved through the 
giving of a hostage remained powerful. The hostage still represented 
the subordination of the weaker part to the stronger. On the other 
hand, women could have been perceived as less likely to treat hostages 
violently, especially in cases where the mistreatment of a hostage could 
spark conflict. Taking hostages and captives brought about a perilous bal-
ance of interest. A hostage-giver who despaired of the safety of his loved 
ones might be motivated to do desperate things. There was, therefore, 
an incentive to set his mind at rest as to the security of the hostages, 
which might be achieved by placing them in the care of women. In the 
case of Queen Cynewise of Mercia, according to Bede, her husband 
King Penda was already at war with the hostage’s father, King Oswiu, 
so Cynewise’s holding of the hostage may have minimized his chances 
of meeting a violent end at the hands of Penda if the war went badly for 
him. More practically, Ecgfrith’s location at the queen’s court may have 
also guaranteed that he would not die an accidental death in battle or in 
Penda’s army, causing further strife between the two parties. 
This may also be another reason that Robert of Gloucester was held 
in Queen Matilda’s care. As noted above, when Robert was captured, he 
was handed over to the Queen, who placed him under house arrest at 
Rochester and directed his care personally. As William of Malmesbury 
remarks, the Queen was careful to treat Robert with the utmost respect. 
“The queen,” William writes, 
though she remembered her husband had been fettered by his 
[Robert’s] orders, never allowed any chains to put on him or ven-
tured anything that would have dishonored his royal rank. Finally, 
at Rochester, for he was taken there, he was free to go to the 
churches beneath the castle when he liked, and to talk with whom 
he liked, at least as long as the queen was there.
When the queen finally did leave, he was kept “under open arrest,” but 
was free enough to receive money from his men in order to buy “some 
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expensive horses.”48 William’s depiction of the situation appears rosy, 
but it masks the political tension caused by Robert’s capture. Queen 
Matilda’s husband, King Stephen, was still imprisoned by Robert’s sister, 
the Empress, and the Queen’s careful treatment of Robert may have 
been designed not only to shame the Empress for her mistreatment of 
Stephen, but also to indicate that she understood mistreating Robert 
might push the Empress to treat Stephen worse or refuse to exchange 
the two men. These cases suggest that the most valuable hostages, par-
ticularly those whose death could destabilize an already volatile peace, 
not only received better treatment, but were kept in the care of women 
in particular precisely because women were perceived as gentler, even 
more lax, in their treatment of hostages and captives.
Contextualizing Queens and Female Rulers as Takers 
and Holders of Hostages and Captives
The evidence presented here suggests that royal women were capable of 
participating in taking hostages and captives. They actively took them 
and exercised control over their fates, determining by themselves and 
negotiating with others about their housing and transportation. They 
used hostages and captives as political tools to further their own aims 
and ambitions and those of their families. Royal women used hostages 
and captives to gain land and force rebellious lords into submission. 
They helped to maintain peace and stability in tricky political situations 
by caring for hostages and captives with respect, but they also abused 
hostages and captives to demonstrate power and control and to present 
an image of strength and leadership. 
While this may appear to be a rather limited or simplistic conclusion, 
the implications are potentially far-reaching. Like many historians of 
women and gender, I tend to argue that what we see in the chronicles is 
only the tip of the iceberg. Although this particular study has included 
only royal women involved in hostage- and captive-taking practices, the 
sources indicate that women at all levels of society participated in these 
activities, which suggests that the practice was widespread in medieval 
society.49 Not only did medieval women probably participate in greater 
numbers than historians can ever know, but they are part of a long-
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standing tradition of female participation in such activities across time. 
Scholars need to stop seeing them as aberrant or merely exceptions to 
the rules. As David Hay has noted, “the more one looks outside one’s 
field of specialty, the more one realizes that every age seemed to have 
its anomaly, whether her name was Brunhild, Irene, Matilda, Joan, or 
Elizabeth. At what point do these exceptions become so numerous that 
they can no longer be deemed exceptional?”50
Further, the hostage- and captive-taking practices of queens connect 
to and further expand larger themes of women’s history illuminated by 
scholars. First, the examples presented here provide even more evidence 
that women continued to exercise power throughout the Middle Ages. 
Here I follow the trend of feminist historians in recent decades who 
have argued against the concept of a women’s “Golden Age” in the early 
Middle Ages that was followed by worsening conditions for women in 
the later Middle Ages. This lachrymose assumption about medieval 
women’s lives in the later period was applied to women of all levels of 
society, especially queens, and was advocated by many notable histori-
ans,51 most famously Georges Duby.52 He repeatedly argued in various 
contexts that women after the early Middle Ages were precluded from 
power, primarily because they were denied any role in the lord-vassal 
relationship. It was this relationship that gave medieval lords control 
over warriors, land, and castles, and therefore power, and without it, 
scholars argued, women were helpless pawns. Further, as power became 
more centralized around “the state,” power became more concentrated 
and formal. This left women—whose power tended to be informal and 
family-based—with less access to channels of influence. As a result of 
these two trends—the rise of the “state” and exclusion from the lord-
vassal relationship—according to this theory, women became victims 
of their families and a patriarchal society that feared and loathed them. 
At the heart of this argument is the assumption that misogyny and 
patriarchy completely dominated medieval society. As a result, scholars 
depicted women as dominated and abused by violent male warriors, 
married off young, given no rights, and too often destined to die pain-
fully in childbirth. 
But as Pauline Stafford has remarked, “Women’s history is now too 
sophisticated for ‘Golden Ages’ or for simple stories of advance or retreat. 
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It is time to restore the lives of tenth-, eleventh- and twelfth-century 
women to them.”53 More recent studies of medieval women’s lives have 
suggested that while some women do perhaps fit into the bleaker picture 
of previous historians, others readily engaged in lordship well beyond 
the eleventh century and were active participants in medieval society, 
especially at the highest levels.54 The examples presented here demon-
strate that royal women’s participation in hostage- and captive-taking 
spans both sides of the “Golden Ages” divide, further evidence that these 
women continued to exercise power throughout the High Middle Ages 
and beyond. In large part this may be because, as Eleanor Searle has 
wisely noted, “In concentrating on the gentlemen in order to understand 
the ethos of the military ruling class, we are in danger of understanding 
it incompletely. Men wanted wives, not simply sexual partners and alli-
ances. If they had any sense, they wanted trusted comrades as their wives, 
and there is evidence that those with any sense got trusted comrades.”55 
While Searle may have overstated her case, her point is relevant. Not all 
men in the Middle Ages wanted mere sexual partners or dogsbodies to 
keep house, nor was it necessarily wives that would have fulfilled these 
roles. Medieval men relied on medieval women, especially those in the 
highest echelons of medieval society, to help them rule their lands and 
gain new ones, share their dynastic concerns, and further their dynastic 
goals. When we stop assuming that women could not be a part of the 
power dynamics of the Middle Ages, that they could not assert them-
selves aggressively to protect themselves, their rights, their families, 
and their lands, their participation in activities like taking hostages and 
captives does not seem unusual or abnormal, but part of a larger trend 
of female participation in medieval power structures.
Moreover, the sources do not present a clean dichotomy—life was 
either wonderful or abysmal—but present complex images of medi-
eval women’s lives. Women, like men, experienced life through many 
lenses—wife, daughter, sister, mother, and heiress. They also functioned 
within the parameters of social status and various ethnic, national, and 
religious groupings, all of which shaped and could change their experi-
ence. Rather than fitting the evidence to a theory, it is imperative to let 
the evidence speak for itself, and account for the vicissitudes of women’s 
lives. In Margaret Howell’s words, it is necessary to work within “the 
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tensions between an empirical and an ideological approach. . . . [I]n daily 
life, gender did not always make men aggressive and women defensive.”56 
Gender as a category and misogynistic medieval writings about gender 
and women should not completely dominate our understanding of these 
women’s activities because “gender was not always formal and ritualized, 
not always trapped in the rulings of canon law or the conventions of 
secular romance; it was one thread in the web of human relationships. 
Among real men and women it was forever various and individual.”57 
The hostage- and captive-taking activities of queens and female rul-
ers can help scholars to continue re-evaluating the dominance of the 
negative approach to medieval women’s lives. These practices offer an 
as yet unopened window through which scholars can better see how 
they experienced and functioned within the world around them in a 
multiplicity of ways both as queens/female rulers and as women. We 
can no longer assume that women were not involved in activities like 
taking hostages and captives by using the faulty logic that those are not 
things that women did in the Middle Ages.
Second, the data gathered here supports Theresa Earenfight’s recent 
suggestion that the separation of the study of monarchy and rulership 
into two categories—kingship/kings/public and queenship/queens/
private—is artificial.58 Taking hostages and captives have almost always 
been discussed—implicitly or explicitly—as the sole prerogative of males 
of the medieval warrior classes, part of their duties as they struggled to 
expand and protect their wealth, power, and domains and in negotia-
tions with each other. But as the evidence suggests here, this assumption 
needs to be re-evaluated because it allows no room for queenly female 
participants like those documented here. Earenfight’s reassessment of 
monarchy and rulership, however, helps create space for including royal 
women in these activities. As she notes, “queens and kings did not live 
in isolation.”59 The public/private dichotomy has inaccurately privileged 
those who act in the public realm, and “regards those who operate in 
the private domestic sphere as less legitimate political actors . . . fail[ing] 
to account for the multifocal nature of power in its many guises.”60 
Kings also exercised power in the so-called private realm as patrons, 
fathers, sons, husbands, intercessors, and all of the other roles normally 
trumpeted as the domain of women and the source of women’s power. 
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Likewise, women acted in the “public realm” as judges, diplomats, and 
military commanders. This is not to suggest that women participated 
in these roles as frequently as men, for they did not. But the fact that 
they could suggests that the boundaries between “male” and “female” 
powers or roles are much blurrier than has been argued in the past. Just 
as such “domestic” roles need to be interwoven into the history of kings 
and kingship, so the “public” roles of queens need to be reinserted into 
the narrative of queenship. 
More generally, queens need to be reintroduced into the study of 
monarchy more broadly, for “while we may accept the fact that male 
rule was always everywhere privileged and that women governed only 
at the discretion, permission, and ultimately, at the pleasure of a man 
(or group of men), this does not mean that the subject of monarchy 
is exclusively a male noun.”61 Monarchy and kingship are not synony-
mous, and as Earenfight suggests, by using the term “rulership,” and 
eliminating the public/private dichotomy, historians can move toward 
an understanding of power at the top that includes those other than 
the king. Kings and queens shared power, both public and private, and 
while they shared that power unequally, to ignore the fact that women 
had a share of, and a stake in, that power is to depict women who did 
exercise such powers as exceptional, abnormal, or marginalized. But 
women could and patently did exercise such powers and did so in a 
way that was considered a part of their everyday capacity as rulers and 
elites regardless of gender. Their exercise of power came through their 
association with and inclusion in the lordship or monarchy, in which 
kings and queen and lords and their ladies “formed an integral part of 
the interlocking political, social, economic and legal institutional struc-
ture of each kingdom” and lordship. They were not ‘paired opposites,’ 
in which the king or lord completely dominated the other and wholly 
suppressed the lady’s ability to act, but ‘complementary elements.’”62 
The evidence presented here suggests that the care of hostages and cap-
tives may be yet another, little discussed role for royal and elite women, 
comparable to that of intercessor, wife, mother, sister, daughter, patron 
of the church, moral guide to one’s family, and manager of the royal 
or lordly household, all of which have already been illuminated in the 
scholarship. Dealing with hostages and captives appears to be yet one 
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more way queens share in the power and duties of rulership along with 
their male counterparts. Overlooking evidence such as that presented 
here therefore leaves incomplete historians’ growing understanding of 
how queenship functioned.
Scholars of queenship and kingship themselves have likely ignored 
this evidence because the tendency has been to associate military endeav-
ors—and as a result, hostage- and captive-related activities—with the 
public power of kings and male lords, whereas queens and female lords, 
following the public/private dichotomy, have been associated with the 
more private aspects of royalty and ruling. But this exclusion needs to 
be rethought. First, despite the modern labeling of taking hostages and 
captives as “male” or “masculine” because it was a public and war-time 
activity, women clearly took and held hostages and captives. Second, 
the detention of hostages and captives in the royal or lordly household, 
often under the care of women, makes the categorization of hostage- 
and captive-holding as either a “public” or “private” issue ambiguous at 
best. This further demonstrates that the “public/private” divide is no 
longer a valid conceptualization of relationships between royal men’s and 
women’s roles. The living conditions of hostages and captives, especially 
high-profile ones, often resembled those of glorified household guests 
restricted in their access to the outside world. This makes taking and 
holding hostages and captives both profoundly “public” and “private” at 
the same time, and therefore the women who cared for them function 
in both realms. The confinement, treatment, and exchange of hos-
tages and captives often had profound public implications for other, less 
militaristic aspects of the state like the negotiation of a treaty between 
two kingdoms. Because queens are often perceived as uninvolved in 
these public aspects of rulership, they have been largely overlooked as 
participants in such activities and vice versa. But as the evidence here 
suggests, women were active participants in these customs, and their 
participation warrants discussion. 
Furthermore, the importance of elite and royal women as diplomats 
and mediators between their natal and marital families meant that they 
often used their “private” status as wife, mother, sister, and daughter 
to negotiate in the “public” realm.63 Scholars should not, therefore, 
neglect to take notice of women who perform what have in the past 
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been considered “non-traditional” or masculine activities or consider 
these women aberrant as a result. Women clearly moved between the 
so-called “public” and “private” realms with regularity, and those who 
perform “public” or “non-female” activities like taking and holding 
hostages and captives need to be considered alongside those women who 
perform more “traditional” activities. Furthermore, the whole process 
of dividing women into categories of those who acted within traditional 
bounds and those who did not needs to be reconsidered. As more and 
more types of activities performed by women are being discovered and 
analyzed by scholars, it becomes clearer that as noted above, we need to 
take a more nuanced and individualized approach to women’s lives. This 
is not to say that there were not some activities that were considered more 
appropriate for women by their medieval contemporaries and others that 
were considered less so. But we should keep in mind that the boundaries 
of what was considered appropriate might vary according to all sorts of 
factors such as age, rank, class, location, and the individual circumstances 
of a woman’s marital and natal families. The two Matildas serve as an 
excellent example of this; both women, the Empress and the Queen, 
took and cared for hostages, but each woman’s reputation was affected 
differently. The Empress was widely condemned for her treatment of 
hostages—in particular, King Stephen—and Queen Matilda praised, 
even by the opposing side, for her treatment of Robert of Gloucester. 
This suggests that the circumstances, not their particular gender or 
the action of taking and holding a hostage or captive per se, caused the 
different responses to their actions.
Furthermore, the role of queens in hostage- and captive-taking prac-
tices suggests that scholars need to re-evaluate their role—and more 
broadly, the role of women—in medieval warfare. Often written out of 
contemporary chronicle and historical sources by mostly male ecclesiasti-
cal authors focused on the deeds of men, kings, and God, women have 
been often overlooked by scholars in discussions of medieval warfare. 
As Linda Grant De Pauw notes, “Women have always and everywhere 
been inextricably involved in war. . . . During war women are ubiqui-
tous and highly visible; when wars are over and the war songs are sung, 
women disappear.”64 As a result, we are left with only a few examples 
in these sources of women in these roles. How to interpret that lack 
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of evidence—as either a sign that this role was indeed a rare one for 
women or that the sources depict only the tip of the iceberg—is not an 
easy decision. But these examples, when placed in context with each 
other and with other evidence of women’s wartime activities, are tell-
ing. Groundbreaking research has recently revealed that, contrary to 
prior assumptions, women were actively involved in almost all aspects 
of medieval warfare, even, on rare occasions, combat.65 They were the 
cause of war and actively instigated it, raised money for troops, provided 
soldiers and supplies, led soldiers to battle, went on campaign with 
their husbands, gave advice about battles and military tactics, inherited, 
owned, controlled, and built castles for military purposes, organized 
defenses during war, brought water for troops, and provided encourage-
ment during battle, negotiated the end of hostilities and urged peace, 
and served as peace bonds by marrying their family’s enemies. Nor were 
these activities unusual or inappropriate. As Jean Truax has pointed 
out, “women who acted as feudal overlords, whether in their own right 
or as the representatives of male relatives, controlled the resources of 
money and manpower necessary for waging war.”66 Women also served 
as household managers, handling the everyday logistics of running large 
estates in times of both peace and war, making them particularly suited 
for pulling together those resources and deploying them when required. 
Moreover, women were literally surrounded by the accoutrements of 
war and grew up with it as a part of their everyday lives. Because there 
were no centrally or rigidly organized and trained armies in the Middle 
Ages and warriors were associated with the households of their lords, 
the castles and fortified houses in which women lived were the training 
grounds for medieval warriors. As a result, “wives and women . . . had 
the opportunity to learn the basics of strategy and military planning by 
cooperating with their husbands, their parents and the streams of soldiers 
flowing through their increasingly fortified estates. . . . [And] when the 
men died, some of these women simply applied what they had learned, in 
much the same way that contemporary burgher widows continued to ply 
their deceased husbands’ trade.”67 Women’s active assistance to their male 
counterparts in hostage- and captive-taking and holding must be placed, 
therefore, within this context, as well. Women were knowledgeable—
indeed, expected to be knowledgeable—about these sorts of activities. 
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Taking hostages and captives was an integral part of defending castles, 
running estates, and many of the other activities women engaged in not 
only for themselves, but also on behalf or in place of their husbands, 
fathers, sons, and brothers.
What all this evidence indicates is that taking and holding hostages 
and captives was not the sole prerogative of men or warriors, nor were 
the women who performed these tasks abnormal or exceptional because 
these activities were related to warfare and therefore off-limits to the 
average medieval female. Such practices were the right of rulers regard-
less of sex or whether or not they participated in battles. Although these 
queens may have not taken physical possession of enemy warriors, they 
could and did hold these warriors captive or hostage, exercise the right 
to determine their fate, the price of their ransom and freedom, the 
conditions of their captivity, and the political and social implications of 
their confinement. Because these women were queens—women who 
shared with their husbands the rights and duties of rulership—they 
were considered capable of dealing with hostages and captives. Despite 
the fact that they probably never lifted a sword, the queens discussed 
here were capable as women of arranging for  punishments, ransoms, and 
hostages. The ruling practices of medieval monarchies need to be further 
re-examined in order to account for the greater movement of men and 
women across the so-called public/private divide. Hostage- and captive-
taking practices provide one more set of evidence that suggests scholars 
can no longer in good conscience argue that women were incapable of 
regularly exercising power in the medieval world. 
Borough of Manhattan Community College-CUNY
 end notes
1. William of Malmesbury, Historia Novella:The Contemporary History, 
ed. Edmund King, trans. K. R. Potter (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 119. 
Hereafter noted as HN.
2. A definition of what constitutes a hostage and captive is perhaps 
useful here. Adam Kosto, on whose definitions I rely, argues that unlike 
33
contemporary conceptions of hostageship which emphasize the role of force 
and derive from the modern framework of international terrorism, medieval 
hostageship centers around “the contractual role of the hostage: a hostage . . . 
is a form of surety, a person deprived of liberty by a second person in order 
to guarantee an undertaking of a third.” In this way, a hostage is different 
from a captive—who is also deprived of liberty, but is not a surety—and also 
a guarantor, who is surety, but not deprived of liberty. He acknowledges, 
however, that the terminology sometimes slips, not only in the use of the 
words for hostage (obses) and captive (captivus) in the sources, but also in 
situations where authors do not clearly differentiate their subjects as mem-
bers of either category, sometimes making the process of distinguishing hos-
tages from captives difficult. Kosto, “Hostages during the First Century of 
the Crusades,” Medieval Encounters 9, no. 1 (2003): 3-31; 7; Kosto, “Hostages 
and the Habit of Representation in Thirteenth-Century Occitania,” in The 
Experience of Power in Medieval Europe: 950-1350, ed. Robert F. Berkhofer 
III, Alan Cooper, and Adam J. Kosto (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 185; Kosto, 
“Hostages in the Carolingian world (714-840),” Early Medieval Europe 11, no. 
2 (2002):123-47.
3. Yvonne Friedman, “Women in Captivity and their Ransom during the 
Crusader Period,” in Cross Cultural Convergences in the Crusader Period, ed. 
Michael Goodich, Sophia Menache, and Sylvia Schein (New York: Lang, 
1995); Friedman, Encounter Between Enemies: Captivity and Ransom in the 
Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
4. This is not to say that other women did not participate in these types 
of activities. Quite the contrary. Women at all levels of society appear to have 
taken hostages and captives, although most examples feature women from 
the knightly, lordly, or royal classes. The limitation to queens and female 
rulers here is more or less in place in order to keep the data at a manageable 
level.
5. For Roman hostage taking practices, see Joel Allen, Hostages and 
Hostage-taking in the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 9ff. As Allen remarks, “It would be fair to say that Roman 
writers—historians and otherwise—were obsessed with hostages.”
6. As Friedman, writing about captivity in the Latin East, has noted, 
“The chroniclers, while they sometimes mention the fact that people were 
taken captive, seldom bother to tell us about their subsequent fate, as if cap-
tivity were the end of the story, as it probably was in many cases.” Likewise, 
James Brodman notes in his study of the Order of Merced, “The threat of 
34
capture, whether by pirates or coastal raiders, or during one of [Spain’s] 
intermittent wars, was … so persistent and ordinary … that individual 
instances of capture rarely elicited much notice beyond allusions in chronicles 
and wills.” Friedman, Encounters Between Enemies, 78; James Brodman, 
Ransoming Captives in Crusader Spain: The Order of Merced on the Christian-
Islamic Frontier (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 1.
7. The most glaring example of this is the mistreatment of aristocratic 
hostages and captives. While the general rule was that noble birth protected 
a hostage or captive from violence and harsh treatment, noble hostages and 
captives were regularly abused when it suited the needs or desires of the 
hostage or captive taker. See below.
8. Annette Parks, “Living Pledges: A Study of Hostageship in the High 
Middle Ages, 1050-1300.” (PhD diss., Emory University, 2000), 198-9; 201.
9. Ibid., 199-219.
10. This argument follows Kosto’s definitions as outlined in “Hostages 
in the Carolinigian World,” with some modifications to reflect more recent 
studies.
11. “Kosto, “Hostages in the Carolingian World,” 135-6.
12. Ibid., 136-7.
13. Ibid., 137-8.
14. Ryan Lavelle, “The Use and Abuse of Hostages in Later Anglo-Saxon 
England,” Early Medieval Europe 13, no. 3 (2006): 270-4; 295.
15. Kosto, “Hostages in the Carolinigian World,” 144-5.
16. Lavelle,”The Use and Abuse of Hostages,” 274.
17. Ibid., 290-2; Kosto, “Hostages during the First Century of the 
Crusades,” 3-6.
18. Gesta Stephani, ed. and trans, K. R. Potter, intro and notes R. H. C. 
Davis (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 75. Hereafter noted as GS.
19. Although John does not state who the other men she released were, 
he wrote earlier that “Capti sunt autem Bernardus de Baillel, Rogerus de 
Mulbrai, Richardus de Curceio, Willielmus Fossart, Willelmus Peverel, 
Willelmus Clerfeith, et multi alii.” It may be that these men are implied 
since they are here associated with William Peverel. Simeon of Durham, 
Opera Omnia, ed. Thomas Arnold (London, 1885) 2:308-9.
20. John of Worcester, The Chronicle of John of Worcester, ed. R. R. 
Darlington and P. McGurk, trans. Jennifer Bray and P. McGurk (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995), 3:292-3. Hereafter noted as JW.
21. GS, 76-77.
35
22. Ibid., 80.
23. Ibid., 118.
24. Ibid., 119.
25. Orderic Vitalis, The Ecclesiastical History, ed. and trans. Marjorie 
Chibnall (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 6:512-15.
26. “The recourse to such treatment of important captives was an indirect 
manifestation of the great strength of castles. In siege warfare, the art of 
defense so outstripped that of offense that to take such strongholds . . . 
would have necessitated a prolonged and uncertain investment. To gain . . . 
castles at a stroke by the intimidation of an individual, without loss of time, 
men and money, was an act of expediency that few could ignore if presented 
with the opportunity.” Matthew Strickland, War and Chivalry: The Conduct 
and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066-1217 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966),196-9; quote from 199.
27. JW, 3:270-3.
28. Ibid., 3:274-5.
29. Part of the reason for the Chronicle’s hostility towards these events 
is that he was located in the area. Worcester is less than sixty miles from 
Bristol, and less than twenty from Gloucester. This makes him an excellent 
witness for these events, given his proximity. But it also makes him likely to 
exaggerate the horror of events, because they were so close to home.
30. Matilda had been named heir to the English throne by her father, 
Henry I, but despite several oath swearings during Henry’s lifetime to guar-
antee her assumption of the throne, the barons of England had overlooked 
her at Henry’s death. While the details are too lengthy to present here, 
much of this had to do with the fact that she was a woman and that she was 
married to the Duke of Anjou, whom the Anglo-Norman barons considered 
a deadly enemy.
31. Marjorie Chibnall, The Empress Matilda: Queen Consort, Queen 
Mother and Lady of the English (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 53: The Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle, ed. and trans. Michael Swanton (London Phoenix, 2002), 
256. Hereafter noted as ASC.
32. Florentii Wigornensis Monachi Chronicon ex Chronicis, ed Benjamin 
Thorpe (London, 1848-9) 2:135. Although as the title suggests, this work 
was formerly attributed to “Florence of Worcester,” it is now known that 
the author of the Chronicon ex Chronicis was John of Worcester. See the 
“Introduction” to JW, 2:xvii-xviii, and also M. Brett, “John of Worcester and 
His Contemporaries,” in The Writing of History in the Middle Ages: Essays 
36
Presented to Richard William Southern, ed. R. H. C. Davis and J. M. Wallace-
Hadrill (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 101-26.
33. See Heather Tanner, “Queenship: Office, Custom or Ad Hoc? The 
Case of Matilda III of England (1135-1152),” in Eleanor of Aquitaine: Lord and 
Lady, ed. Bonnie Wheeler and John Carmi Parsons (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002).
34. ASC, 100. John of Worcester also records this event. JW, 2:372-5.
35. She was not particularly pleased with the idea of his release, either. 
Flores Historiarum, ed. Henry Richards Luard (London, 1890) 2:481-2.
36. Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, ed. Henry Richards Luard 
(London, 1872-83) 6.
37. John Carmi Parsons, Eleanor of Castile: Queen and Society in 
Thirteenth-Century England (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995), 218-19.
38. Renowned for her beauty, Isabel became the second wife of King 
John of England at the age of 12 in 1200, despite the fact she was promised 
to another man (see below). She was much younger than John, so when 
he died, she was still in her twenties. She was also Countess of Angoulême 
in her own right, which made her potentially an extremely valuable bride. 
Between John and her second husband, Hugh, she had fourteen children, all 
of whom survived into adulthood. As an active meddler in medieval English 
and French politics, often to seek her own political advantage, many of the 
sources are not favorable to her, especially English ones because she and her 
second husband sided against her son, King Henry III of England in the ter-
ritorial disputes between France and England.
39. Nicholas Vincent, “Isabella of Angoulême: John’s Jezebel,” In King 
John: New Interpretations, ed. S. D. Church (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell 
Press, 1999), 206-7. A letter from her to Pandulf, the bishop-elect of 
Norwich, about this matter survives, which even goes on to accuse Henry 
III of helping Bartholomew against her. W. W. Shirley, ed., Royal and Other 
Historical Letters Illustrative of the Reign of Henry III (London, 1866), 1:32-4; 
See also The Letters of the Queens of England, 1100-1547, ed. Anne Crawford 
(Dover, NH: Sutton, 1994), 52-3. 
40. Harold Snellgrove, The Lusignans in England, 1247-1258 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1950), 10-15.
41. For a summary of Blanche’s regency, see Theodore Evergates, 
“Aristocratic Women in the County of Champagne,” in Aristocratic Women 
in Medieval France, ed. Theodore Evergates (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 81-85.
37
42. Dmitri Starostine, “Hostage by Agreement and the Language of 
Dependence in the Eleventh Century: Mutation or Corruption?” in Latin 
Culture in the Eleventh Century: Proceedings of the Third International 
Conference on Medieval Latin Studies, Cambridge, September 9-12, 1998, ed. 
Michael W. Herren, C. J. McDonough, and Ross G. Arthur (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2002), 2:389-91. Starostine incorrectly dates the rebellion, which 
did not start until 1216, and Theobald was not captured until 1218.
43. Lavelle, “Use and Abuse of Hostages,” 284. 
44. The circumstances in which Ecgfrith became a hostage at Queen 
Cynewise’s court are unclear. According to Bede, Penda invaded North-
umbria at the head of a large army, despite Oswiu’s attempt to buy Penda 
off with “an incalculable and incredible store of royal treasures and gifts.” 
Ecgfrith’s status as a hostage is mentioned only as an afterthought; Bede 
writes that, while Oswiu and his son Alhfrith were at war with Penda, 
Oswiu’s “other son Ecgfrith was at the time a hostage in the Mercian 
kingdom with Queen Cynewise.” It reads like an explanation to the curious 
reader as to why the other son was not fighting with his father. See Bede, 
The Ecclesiastical History of the English People; The Greater Chronicle; Bede’s 
Letter to Egbert, trans. Bertram Colgrave, ed. and intro. Judith McClure and 
Roger Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 288-90. Nennius’s 
Historia Brittonum also mentions Penda’s invasion of Northumbria at this 
time, but states that Penda in fact accepted Oswiu’s large gift. D. P Kirby 
argues that Oswiu submitted to Penda at a siege near Stirling, and that his 
son was handed over as a peace hostage. D. P. Kirby, The Earliest English 
Kings (London: Routledge, 1991), 90, 94-95.
45. Michael Prestwich, Edward I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997), 56.
46. Vincent, “Isabella of Angoulême,” 207.
47. John Robert Maddicott, Simon de Montfort (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 326.
48. HN, 114-17.
49. The evidence for women’s participation in hostage and captive-taking 
is far too overwhelming in sheer volume to cover in one article; thus the 
more limited topic here. The broader social and political context of women’s 
participation in hostage- and captive-taking is the topic of my dissertation, 
and I have discussed the evidence for more widespread participation therein. 
Colleen Slater, “‘Virile Strength in a Feminine Breast:’ Women, Hostageship, 
Captivity, and Society in the Anglo-French World, c. 1000-c.1300,” PhD 
diss., Cornell University, 2009.
38
50. David J. Hay, The Military Leadership of Matilda of Canossa 1046-1115 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 253-5.
51. For example: Shulamith Shahar, The Fourth Estate: A History of 
Women in the Middle Ages, trans. Chaya Galai (London: Methuen, 1983); 
Joan Ferrante, Woman as Image in Medieval Literature from the Twelfth 
Century to Dante (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975; James 
Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987).
52. Georges Duby, Women of the Twelfth Century. Volume Two: 
Remembering the Dead, trans. Jean Birrell (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997); Love and Marriage in the Middle Ages, trans. Jane Dunnett 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); The Knight, the Lady, and the 
Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval France, trans. Barbara 
Bray (New York: Pantheon, 1983; Medieval Marriage: Two Models from 
Twelfth-Century France, trans. Elborg Forster (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978).
53. Pauline Stafford, “Women and the Norman Conquest,” Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society, 6th ser., vol. 4 (1994), 249.
54. One can doubtlessly find an abundance of victimized women in 
the early Middle Ages as well, or could if the evidence were more abun-
dant, which cautions us to think carefully before generalizing too much. 
Furthermore, there are examples like the Queens Eleanor and Marguerite of 
Provence and Eleanor of Castile from the thirteenth century, who appear to 
not only have been powerful, but also respected by their kingly husbands. See 
Parsons, Eleanor of Castile; Margaret Howell, Eleanor of Provence: Queenship 
in Thirteenth-Century England (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
55. Eleanor Searle, “Emma the Conqueror,” in Studies in Medieval History 
Presented to R. Allen Brown, ed. Christopher Harper-Bill, Christopher J. 
Holdsworth, and Janet L. Nelson (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1989), 282.
56. Margaret Howell, “Royal Women of England and France in the Mid-
Thirteenth Century: A Gendered Perspective,” in England and Europe in the 
Reign of Henry III (1216-1272), ed. Björn K. U. Weiler and Ifor W. Rowlands 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 176.
57. Ibid., 178.
58. Earenfight is not the first to suggest this. Louise Olga Fradenburg, 
writing in 1992, suggested a similar idea: “. . . Sovereignty depends on the use 
of both the ‘masculine’ and the ‘feminine;’ in fact . . . sovereignty is estab-
lished not only through the elaboration of these constructs—whereby, for 
39
example, the king and queen can be taken as ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ 
in the register of the absolute or the ideal—but also through the disloca-
tion and fluidity of these constructs.” For her discussion in more detail, 
see Louise Olga Fradenburg, “Introduction: Rethinking Queenship,” in 
Women and Sovereignty ed. Louise Olga Fradenburg (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1992), 1-3. 
59. Theresa Earenfight, “Without the Person of the Prince: Kings, 
Queens and the Idea of Monarchy in Late Medieval Europe,” Gender and 
History 19:1 (April 2007): 7.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 7-8.
62. Ibid., 14.
63. The case of Matilda of Canossa, whose military career has been 
recently outlined by David Hay, is illustrative here and may provide clues for 
examining the lives of other women like her. As Hay suggests, Matilda, as 
sole ruler of domains that spread throughout much of northern and central 
Italy and the “most powerful woman of her time,” exercised power not only 
politically and militarily, but also in traditionally “female” ways such as inter-
cession. It was she who protected Pope Gregory VII at her fortress of Canossa, 
and when the Emperor Henry IV came to beg for forgiveness for three days 
in the snow, it was she who interceded personally with Gregory so that Henry 
could be forgiven. She was “not limited to a stereotypically masculine or femi-
nine mode: she played the roles of general and intercessor simultaneously, and 
with equal success.” Hay, Military Leadership of Matilda, 70.
64. Linda Grant De Pauw, Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in War from 
Prehistory to the Present (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), xiii.
65. There is an increasingly large bibliography for medieval women’s 
relationship to warfare. See: Megan McLaughlin, “The Woman Warrior: 
Gender, Warfare, and Society in Medieval Europe,” Women’s Studies 17 
(1990); Keren Caspi-Reisfeld, “Women Warriors during the Crusades, 1095-
1254,” in Gendering the Crusades, ed. Sarah B. Edgington and Sarah Lambert 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) as well as all the articles in 
Gendering the Crusades which treat women’s participation from multiple 
angles; David Hay, “Canon Laws Regarding Female Military Commanders 
up to the Time of Gratian: Some Texts and Their Historical Contexts,” 
in A Great Effusion of Blood? Interpreting Medieval Violence, ed. Mark D. 
Meyerson, Daniel Thiery, and Oren Falk (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2004); Helen Solterer, “Figures of Female Militancy in Medieval 
40
France.” Signs 16, no. 3 (Spring, 1991): 522-549; Jean A. Truax, “Anglo-
Norman Women at War: Valiant Soldiers, Prudent Strategists or Charismatic 
Leaders?” in The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval and 
Naval History, ed. Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon (Rochester, 
NY: Boydell Press, 1999); James M. Blythe, “Women in the Military: 
Scholastic Arguments and Medieval Images of Female Warriors,” History 
of Political Thought 22, no. 2 (Summer, 2001): 242-69; Helen Nicholson, 
“Women on the Third Crusade,” Journal of Medieval History, 23, no. 4 
(1997): 335-49; J. F. Verbrüggen “Women in Medieval Armies,” trans. Kelly 
DeVries, in Journal of Medieval Military History, ed. Clifford J. Rogers Kelly 
DeVries, and John France (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006): 119-36.
66. Truax, “Anglo-Norman Women at War,” 111. She also notes that, in 
this sense, women were very much like male clerics. Ibid, 124-5.
67. Hay, Matilda of Canossa, 7-8. 
